Botched Basra offensive leaves both Iraqi and US governments embarrassed, confused

Source Inter Press Service
Source Los Angeles Times
Source Agence France-Presse
Source Associated Press
Source New York Times
Source Times (UK)
Source Azzaman
Source GlobalSecurity.org
Source Washington Post. (The Global Report)

An offensive launched by the Iraqi government troops and police under the direct supervision of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki has ended in embarrassment and confusion for both the Iraqi government and its puppet-masters in Washington, and a major military and political victory for the young populist cleric Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army. Less than a week after the offensive was launched, ostensibly to "root out gangs and organized criminals" in Basra, the Prime Minister traveled to al Sadr's villa in Iran and, according to the London Times, agreed to a nine-point plan to end hostilities dictated by al Sadr and his Iranian hosts. The plan called on the Maliki government to end the campaign without having gained any ground, and rendered null and void the government's ultimatum requiring al Sadr's followers to disarm within ten days. The Maliki government insists that they have merely extended the deadline for disarming, but it is clear that they have neither the military nor the political clout to enforce it. Interviews with numerous Iraqi leaders and observers representing all major factions confirm the Times' assessment that the Maliki government's political capital had "crashed through the floor". One Kurdish lawmaker described the debacle as–a big victory for Iran over America and for Moqtada over Maliki." The offensive was initially hailed by the Bush Administration. Mr. Bush himself described it as a "defining moment in Iraqi history". Even as hostilities diminished as a result of al Sadr's ordering his armed followers to stand down, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was still claiming that "all of us in the government were pleased to see Prime Minister Maliki take this on, take the initiative and go down there himself with Iraqi forces and try to resolve the issue." Despite the failure of Iraq's regular forces to accomplish any of their objectives, Gates declared that "they seem to have done a pretty good job." Others in the US government however were far less generous in their accounts, as they carefully tiptoed away from any hint of US complicity. At the beginning of the campaign, the official US military spokesman confirmed that "coalition forces" were providing intelligence, surveillance, and support aircraft for the operation. But as word began spreading that the operation was going badly, unnamed Administration officials informed the Washington Post that Maliki's actions were a complete mystery that "we can't quite decipher". A couple of days later, the New York Times quoted a senior US official in Iraq arguing that Maliki's trip to Basra was "not intended to be the start of major combat operations" and that Maliki had "miscalculated" in launching the strike. No one was more decisive and unequivocal in asserting the lack of US involvement in or knowledge of the operation than Presidential hopeful John McCain, the Arizona Senator who recently erroneously declared that Iran was training operatives of their arch-enemy al Qaeda -- which has labeled the Iranian government "illegitimate" and "apostate" -- and sending them to Iraq. "Maliki decided to take on this operation without consulting the Americans," he stated flatly. Without Joe Lieberman nearby to whisper a correction in his ear, McCain went on to express "surprise" that the Iraqi Prime Minister would "take it on himself, to go down and take charge of a military offensive." Equally decisive in asserting that McCain was dead wrong in his assessment was Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who stated the next day in a Pentagon news conference that US commanders were informed of the operation before it was launched. It may well turn out that Mr. Bush was right to call this event a "defining moment in Iraqi history". A wave of reports from Iraq indicate that tens of thousands of Iraqi Army regulars and Iraqi policemen refused to fight against the the Mahdis, referring to them as their countrymen and their "brothers". The Los Angeles Times described one incident in Baghdad where the local constabulary held a ceremony of surrender to the Mahdi Army. They offered up their weapons, according to the report, but the Mahdi representatives refused to take them, saying that they "belonged to the government". The two sides exchanged olive branches and copies of the Q'uran instead. The Iraqi tabloid Azzaman reports that the Maliki government has dismissed tens of thousands of police and army personnel who refused to fight, and is replacing them with members of the Badr Corps militia, which is aligned with the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council of Abdul Aziz al Hakim, who was an exile in Iran for over twenty years prior to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The Badr Corps was largely trained and armed by Iran, according to the independent intelligence agency Global Security dot org. Azzaman also reports that at least two regiments of Iraqi forces in Baghdad actually switched sides and fought with the Mahdi Army. Retired General William Odom may have defined the moment best when he stated in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in advance of the much-anticipated report from Gen. Petraeus later this week that the Maliki govennment had "initiated military action and then dragged in US forces to help his own troops destroy his Shiite competitors. This is a political setback, not a political solution," Odom continued. "Such is the result of the surge tactic."