CIA stalls publication of records on use of ex-Nazi spies

Huge gaps remain in the public record of US ties to former Nazis who were recruited to spy on postwar adversaries including the Soviet Union, according to a report issued on Sept. 28. The final report was submitted to Congress by an interagency group that examined the United States' use of World War Two war criminals during and after the war. The group, created by the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 and the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act of 2000, has released more than 8.5 million pages of previously classified government documents dating back to 1933. The list includes the entire 1.2 million-page operational file of the CIA's World War Two forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services. The 139-page report addressed a post-Sept. 11 trend toward greater government secrecy by laying out recommendations to improve what it called a broken declassification system. It said agency resistance to disclosure drove overall project costs up nearly three-fold to $30 million. But a section of the report that contains contributions by individuals and agencies involved in the effort suggests the disclosure has been less than complete. Former New York congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, a member of the panel, said the group received files on about 60,000 former Nazi and Japanese war criminals but did not have the names of all collaborators, particularly those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. "Even though we employed various search strategies to obtain these documents, there are undoubtedly huge gaps in our work," she said. Holtzman also called into question the value of recruiting spies among former Nazis, who were sometimes blackmailed into serving as double agents by America's Soviet adversaries. "It is not clear that Nazis provided us with any useful intelligence, and we know that in some cases at least they were a serious detriment to us," she added. "Given the intelligence failures of the Iraq War, it might be important for US policymakers to understand that using very bad people for intelligence activities does not automatically get us very good results, and instead, may get us very bad results," Holtzman said.