Divide and rule–The US plan for Baghdad

Faced with an ever-more ruthless insurgency in Baghdad–despite President Bush's "surge" in troops–US forces in the city are now planning a massive and highly controversial counterinsurgency operation that will seal off vast areas of the city, enclosing whole neighborhoods with barricades and allowing only Iraqis with newly issued ID cards to enter. The campaign of "gated communities"–whose genesis was in the Vietnam War–will involve up to 30 of the city's 89 official districts and will be the most ambitious counterinsurgency program yet mounted by the US in Iraq. The system has been used–and has spectacularly failed–in the past, and its inauguration in Iraq is as much a sign of US desperation at the country's continued descent into civil conflict as it is of US determination to "win" the war against an Iraqi insurgency that has cost the lives of more than 3,200 US troops. The system of "gating" areas under foreign occupation failed during the French war against insurgents in Algeria and again during the US war in Vietnam. Israel has employed similar practices during its occupation of Palestinian territory–again, with little success. But the campaign has far wider military ambitions than the pacification of Baghdad. It now appears that the US military intends to place as many as five mechanized brigades–comprising about 40,000 men–south and east of Baghdad, at least three of them positioned between the capital and the Iranian border. This would present Iran with a powerful–and potentially aggressive–US military force close to its border in the event of a US or Israeli military strike against its nuclear facilities later this year. The latest "security" plan was concocted by General David Petraeus, the current US commander in Baghdad, during a six-month command and staff course at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas. Those attending the course–US army generals serving in Iraq and top officers from the US Marine Corps, along with, according to some reports, at least four senior Israeli officers participated in a series of debates to determine how best to "turn round" the disastrous war in Iraq. The initial emphasis of the new US plan will be placed on securing Baghdad market places and predominantly Shia Muslim areas. Arrests of men of military age will be substantial. The ID card project is based upon a system adopted in the city of Tal Afar by Petraeus's men–and specifically by Colonel H R McMaster, of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment–in early 2005, when an eight-foot "berm" was built around the town to prevent the movement of gunmen and weapons. Petraeus regarded the campaign as a success, although Tal Afar, close to the Syrian border, has since fallen back into insurgent control. So far, the Baghdad campaign has involved only the creation of a few US positions within several civilian areas of the city but the new project will involve joint US and Iraqi "support bases" in nine of the 30 districts to be "gated" off. From these bases–in fortified buildings–US-Iraqi forces will supposedly clear militias from civilian streets which will then be walled off and the occupants issued with ID cards. Only the occupants will be allowed into these "gated communities" and there will be continuous patrolling by US-Iraqi forces. There are likely to be pass systems, "visitor" registration and restrictions on movement outside the "gated communities." Civilians may find themselves inside a "controlled population" prison. In theory, US forces can then concentrate on providing physical reconstruction in what the military like to call a "secure environment." But insurgents are not foreigners, despite the presence of al-Qaida in Iraq. They come from the same population centers that will be "gated" and will, if undiscovered, hold ID cards themselves; they will be "enclosed" with everyone else. A former US officer in Vietnam who has a deep knowledge of Petraeus's plans is skeptical of the possible results. "The first loyalty of any Sunni who is in the Iraqi army is to the insurgency," he said. "Any Shia's first loyalty is to the head of his political party and its militia. Any Kurd in the Iraqi army, his first loyalty is to either Barzani or Talabani. There is no independent Iraqi army. These people really have no choice. They are trying to save their families from starvation and reprisal. At one time they may have believed in a unified Iraq. At one time they may have been secular. But the violence and brutality that started with the American invasion has burnt those liberal ideas out of people…. Every American who is embedded in an Iraqi unit is in constant mortal danger." The senior generals who constructed the new "security" plan for Baghdad were largely responsible for the seminal–but officially "restricted"–field manual on counterinsurgency produced by the Department of the Army in December of last year, code-numbered FM 3-24. While not specifically advocating the "gated communities" campaign, one of its principles is the unification of civilian and military activities, citing "civil operations and revolutionary development support teams" in South Vietnam, assistance to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq in 1991 and the "provincial reconstruction teams" in Afghanistan–a project widely condemned for linking military cooperation and humanitarian aid. FM 3-24 is harsh in its analysis of what counterinsurgency forces must do to eliminate violence in Iraq. "With good intelligence," it says, "counterinsurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact." But another former senior US officer has produced his own pessimistic conclusions about the "gated" neighborhood project. "Once the additional troops are in place the insurrectionists will cut the lines of communication from Kuwait to the greatest extent they are able," he said in an interview. "They will do the same inside Baghdad, forcing more use of helicopters. The helicopters will be vulnerable coming into the patrol bases, and the enemy will destroy as many as they can. The second part of their plan will be to attempt to destroy one of the patrol bases. They will begin that process by utilizing their people inside the 'gated communities' to help them enter. They will choose bases where the Iraqi troops either will not fight or will actually support them. "The American reaction will be to use massive firepower, which will destroy the neighborhood that is being 'protected.'" The ex-officer's fears for US helicopter crews were reemphasized on Apr. 10 when a military Apache was shot down over central Baghdad. The ex-officer's son is an officer currently serving in Baghdad. "The only chance the American military has to withdraw with any kind of tactical authority in the future is to take substantial casualties as a token of their respect for the situation created by the invasion," he said. "The effort to create some order out of the chaos and the willingness to take casualties to do so will leave some residual respect for the Americans as they leave."